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How to Make Sense of
Quantum Mechanics (and More):
Fundamental Physical Theories
and Primitive Ontology
Valia Allori1
Abstract
Quantum mechanics has always been regarded as, at best, puzzling, if not contradictory. The
aim of the paper is to explore a particular approach to fundamental physical theories, the one
based on the notion of primitive ontology. This approach, when applied to quantum mechanics,
makes it a paradox-free theory.
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1. Introduction
There is a basic philosophical question that involves physics, metaphysics, and
epistemology: can we describe what the world is like through a fundamental physical
theory? This question corresponds to the historic disagreement between scientific
realists and antirealists. The position of the antirealist is the one according to which we
should not believe that physics reveals us something about reality but rather we should
be content with physics to be, for example, just empirically adequate. In contrast, the
realist is strongly inclined to say not only that physics tells us about reality, but perhaps
also that it is our only way to do metaphysics properly. Quantum mechanics has always
been taken to be devastating for the realist program: it is considered a paradoxical
theory, full of contradictions and mysteries, and therefore not suitable to describe
physical reality. In this paper, I wish to explore a particular approach to fundamental
physical theories according to which quantum mechanics comes out paradox-free, and
thus the scientific realist will be able to use it just like any other theory to complete her
program of reading off the metaphysics from the physics. This approach is based on a
particular notion, the one of primitive ontology (PO). This has been sketched in various
articles2. Roughly, the PO is what in a physical theory represents matter, while the other
variables in the theory help to implement the law of temporal evolution of the PO. In
this paper, I wish to discuss and analyze the various ingredients of the PO approach
and see how, when applied to quantum mechanics, it turns it into a perfectly ‘normal’
theory.
Here is the outline: in the next section, I discuss the different roles and meaning of the
various variables present in a fundamental physical theory. In doing that, I introduce
the notion of primitive ontology and of physical equivalence: theories with the same
histories of the PO should be considered physically equivalent, thus as different

See in particular [DGZ 1992, 1995, 1997], [Goldstein 2008], [AGTZ 2008, 2011,2014], [Allori
2013a,b].
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formulation of the same theory. In Section 3, I present the measurement problem of
quantum mechanics and its standard solutions: Bohmian mechanics, the GRW theory,
and the many-worlds theory. Then I argue that the real problem of quantum mechanics
is not, as the measurement problem suggests, the existence of macroscopic
superpositions, but rather that the wave function is taken to represent physical objects.
In fact, the wave function is not defined in space-time, and its role in the theory is
different from the one of the PO. In Section 6, after having discussed what it means for a
theory to be empirically adequate, I present possible empirically adequate quantum
theories in which the wave function is not the PO. These theories are obtained varying
the type of PO, its evolution, and the evolution of the wave function. In Section 7, I
move to the issue of the meaning of the wave function in these theories, which in this
approach is often taken to be similar to a law of nature. In the last two sections, I
compare the various theories, showing how some of them display a many-world
character, and discussing how the notion of symmetry properties is connected with the
PO. In addition, I show how one could possibly classify these theories: in some of them,
the PO is independent of the wave function, while in others the PO is a function of it.

2. Mathematical Representation of Physical Objects in a Fundamental
Physical Theory
Granted that physics is able to provide information about the world, any fundamental
physical theory should clearly specify what exists in the world according to the theory.
To put it differently, since any fundamental physical theory is written in terms of
mathematical entities that obey given laws of motion, the theory should clearly specify
what connection there is between the entities in the mathematics and the entities in the
world. In fact, if we do not give any rule of correspondence between the objects of
mathematics and the one in the world, we cannot say we have a physical theory, but
just a collection of mathematical statements.
Usually, the scientist that proposes a given fundamental physical theory has already a
metaphysical hypothesis in mind, namely she already has an idea about what are the
fundamental objects there are in the world. For instance, as Newton did, she may think
that the world is made of particles. Then, when she puts the theory in mathematical
form, she uses the mathematical object that naturally corresponds to her metaphysical
hypothesis. Points in ℝ3 naturally represent particles' positions, vector or scalar--valued
functions defined in ℝ3 naturally represent fields, and so on.
According to classical mechanics, the world is made of particles, whose position is
naturally mathematically represented by points in three--dimensional space. Suppose
instead that one did not specify any connection between the mathematics and the
world. Then it is hard to see what the theory describes and predicts. In fact, take
3
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+ 𝑞𝐸(𝑟) = 𝑚 𝑑𝑡 2 : what is this equation describing? One cannot say that it represents

the equation of motion of a massive particle because there is no specification of what the
different symbols mean. In order for that equation to be more than a string of
meaningless symbols, one would need to specify that there are actually particles in the
world, whose position in space is represented by a vector r in ℝ3. We also need to
specify that the particle under consideration has a mass, represented mathematically by
the natural number m, it a has charge, represented by the natural numbers q, and it
evolves in time t according to that particular equation, which involves the constant G,
and the electric field, represented by the scalar function E. Only at that point we have a
physical theory, otherwise we have simply some nice mathematics.

2.1. Theory Architecture, Primitive Ontology and Local Beables
However, not all variables in a theory are on the same footing. Considering the example
above, the particles may have, say, masses, not the other way round. What would it
mean to say that a mass has a position? Consider velocities: what would it mean to say
that a velocity has a position? In this last case, in particular, the velocity is defined in
terms of position, so it seems even more natural to think of velocity as on a different
level than position. Therefore, first, we postulate that there are particles, completely
specified by their positions, mathematically represented by points in three-dimensional
space; then we specify what properties they have. In this sense, the particles are the
primitive ontology, PO, of classical mechanics. Thus, some mathematical objects in the
theory, in this case the three-dimensional points representing particles, which are
privileged over the others. The variables in the theory have a hierarchical structure,
determined by the role they play in the theory: on the foundation one finds the variable
that represent matter, the primitive variable, which in the example above is r, and we
have seen are of crucial importance for the theory. Then we have many other variables:
some are constants of nature, like G in the example above; some others may be taken as
describing properties of the PO, like m or q above, which are also constant but may vary
depending on the particle under consideration; some are used to parametrize the
trajectory of the PO, as t in the equation above. None of these variables is the PO;
particles are. In other words, none of them represents matter: table and chairs are not
made of charges, say, they are made of particles with charges.
Finally, we have other variables, like the one representing the electric field E above,
mathematically represented by a vector field in three-dimensional space. These ‘local
beables,’ to use the terminology introduced in [Bell 1987], may or may not be taken to
be part of the PO. In fact, on the one hand, one may think that they compose tables and
chairs, and thus they are part of the PO, together with particles. That would mean,
though, that there are fundamentally two kinds of ‘substances’ in the world: particles,
and electric fields. On the other hand, one could notice that the fields are introduced to
4

account for the motion of the particles: they help implementing the motion of the
particles. So their role in the theory does not seem the same as the role of the particles,
they are non-primitive in this respect. Because of their role in generating the law of
evolution of the PO, it seems more appropriate to consider them non-primitive,
nomological, variables. Roughly speaking, the PO tells us what there is, and the nonprimitive variables tell the PO how to move. In other words, the reason why there are
other variables in the theory other than the primitive ones is to ‘close the dynamics’ for
the PO.

2.2. Macroscopic Properties and Primitive Ontology
As a result of taking (microscopic) particles as its PO, classical mechanics is arguably
able to account for each and every (macroscopic) property of physical objects. As long
as we can neglect quantum effects, macroscopic solid bodies, gases, fluids (i.e. tables,
water, air…) and their properties (the solidity of the table, the transparency of the
water, and the temperature of air) can be accounted for in terms of the motion of pointlike particles moving in three-dimensional space. More precisely, the behavior of
extended rigid bodies can be accounted for only considering the motion of their center
of mass under the action of definite forces, after an analysis in terms of them as made of
interacting point--particles. Similarly, the behavior of gases and fluids is accounted for
considering them as composed by many non-interacting identical particles that collide
with one another. Indeed, this is how thermodynamics can be derived from statistical
mechanics: what in thermodynamics we call pressure, volume, temperature of a gas are
derived in the framework of statistical mechanics from the fact that gases are supposed
to be composed of small moving particles.
It is crucial to notice that the ingredients that are necessary for this explanatory schema
to succeed are fundamentally two: 1) the PO is microscopic; 2) the PO is in space-time.
Without the first requirement, the objects in the PO will not be the building blocks of
every other physical object. This is important because the particles clump together in
forming bigger objects, which arguably then behave more or less independently on
their initial composition. For instance, protons, neutrons and electrons bind together to
form atoms, and they behave according to the laws of chemistry; then atoms bind
together to form more complicated molecules that obey the laws of biology, and so on.
It is this hierarchy of objects, with at its foundations the fundamental particles, is what
allows the explanation of the macroscopic properties in term of the microscopic
constituents. This is where the second requirements of spatio-temporality of the PO
comes in, since it works only if the fundamental building blocks live in the same space
as the macroscopic properties that are explained, namely three-dimensional space, or
four-dimensional space-time. If the fundamental building blocks of nature live in a
different space, as we will see have been suggested, then there is an additional step to
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be made, namely to explain how we think we live in three-dimensional space while we
actually do not (see Section 4).
2.3. Nomological Variables and Physical Equivalence
In order to clarify the difference between the PO and the nomological variables, we
could use the following metaphor [AGTZ 2008]. Suppose we want to write a computer
program for simulating a system according to a certain theory. In writing the program,
we care about the output: the program is able to generate it through other variables, but
they are just of an instrumental value to us. The PO is the output of such program,
while the other variables serve as means for generating this output: they are internal
variables of the program: they may be necessary for doing the computation, but they
are not what the user is interested in. We seem to understand classical theories in this
way: we want to know what the trajectories of the particles, the PO, are. In contrast, the
other variables have just the role of implementing the evolution for the output. This has
a very important consequence: there might be different ways of producing the same
output, using different internal variables. For example, consider Lagrangian mechanics:
it is a reformulation of classical mechanics that many physics students use all the time
to solve problems. One rewrites Newton’s equation using generalized coordinates and a
particular function L, the Lagrangian. In practice, it is easier to find the trajectories using
this formulation rather than the usual one, if the generalized coordinates are chosen
accurately in such a way they can exploit the symmetries in the system. The Lagrangian
formulation is therefore an example of how we can obtain the same output, the
trajectories, in a way that is different from solving Newton’s law of motion. To consider
another example, in classical electrodynamics two fields that differ by a gauge
transformation generate the same law for the PO. As we do not regard an
electromagnetic potential V and another potential that differs from V by a gauge
transformation as a different potential than V, we do not regard classical mechanics and
Lagrangian mechanics as different theories: they provide us with the same result for the
trajectories of the PO. Therefore, we conclude that in general two theories should be
regarded as physically equivalent when they lead to the same history of the PO. They are,
in a very important sense, the same theory.

3. The Measurement Problem and its Standard Solutions
In contrast with classical theories, it is not clear what the underlying metaphysical
assumption is in orthodox quantum mechanics, namely the theory that one finds in
physics textbook. What is matter made of, according to the theory? The typical answer
is usually that it is impossible to describe the microscopic reality if quantum mechanics
is true. Thus, we need to become anti-realist, we have no choice. Accordingly, some
have responded that, at best, quantum theory can be a theory that describes the
6

measurement results. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the sociological and
historical reasons for this claim; let me just say that the so-called measurement problem,
or the problem of the Schrödinger cat, played a crucial role, together with certain
readings of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the various no-go theorems.
Luckily, we now know better than that: it is not true that we have no other option. In
fact, there are at least three counterexamples to this impossibility, namely Bohmian
mechanics [Bohm 1952], the GRW theory [GRW1986] and the many-worlds theory
[Everett 1957], three quantum theories that a scientific realist can use in her program of
doing metaphysics through physics.
These theories have been proposed as a response to the problem of the Schrödinger cat.
The problem in a nutshell is as follows [Schrödinger 1936]. The fundamental object of
orthodox quantum mechanics is the wave function 𝜓, that evolves according the
Schrödinger equation:
𝑁

𝜕𝜓
ℏ2 2
𝑖ℏ
= −∑
∇ 𝜓 + 𝑉𝜓,
𝜕𝑡
2𝑚𝑖 𝑖

(1)

𝑖=1

where is ℏ Planck’s constant. It is a mathematical feature of this theory that sums of
solutions 𝜓𝑖 , i.e. 𝜓 = ∑𝑖 𝑎𝑖 𝜓𝑖 , are also solutions of the equation. That implies that if we
allow the wave function to completely describe every microscopic or macroscopic
physical system, then these ‘superpositions,’ initially on the microscopic level, will
eventually end up describing macroscopic objects like a dead and a living (i.e. nondead) cat. Since this is contradictory, one concludes that there has to be something
wrong in the theory. Since there seems that there are only three assumptions:
a) The wave function provides the complete description of every physical
system;
b) The wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger equation;
c) Macroscopic objects have non-contradictory properties;
then one could solve the problem rejecting one of them [Bell 1987]. Bohmian mechanics
is taken to reject the first, the GRW theory to reject the second, and the many-worlds
theory to reject the third assumption.

3.1. Bohmian Mechanics
The traditional story says that Bohmian mechanics solves the problem of the
Schrödinger cat adding particles to the description of the wave function [Bohm 1952],
[Bell 1987], [DGZ 1992]. There are two equations that define Bohmian mechanics;
Bohm’s equation3:
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This equation, for simplicity, does not account for spin. For the more general equation, see
[DGZ 1992]. I use the standard notations of probability theory, according to which a capital
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𝑑𝑄𝑖
ℏ
∇𝑖 𝜓
(2)
(𝑄1 , … , 𝑄𝑁 )],
=
Im [
𝑑𝑡
𝑚𝑖
𝜓
and the Schrödinger equation (1). Thus, in addition to the wave function, in the theory
there are also particles, with configurations 𝑄𝑖 in three-dimensional space that evolve
according to (2). Thus, the cat is either dead or alive, depending on where her particles
are: if they are ‘under’ the wave function representing a dead cat, the cat is dead; she is
alive otherwise.

3.2. GRW Theory
The GRW theory, or spontaneous collapse theory, was proposed by [GRW 1986], and it
is taken to solve the problem of the Schrödinger cat denying the second premise. In this
theory, the wave function evolves according to a stochastically modified Schrödinger
equation. The wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger equation until a
random time T1 , chosen with exponential probability distribution with rate Nλ. Here
𝜆 = 10−15 s-1 is a constant of nature of the theory, and N is the number of ‘particles’ in
the theory4. At time T1, the wave function undergoes an instantaneous collapse: it
localizes around a random point 𝑋. The collapse is mathematically implemented by
1

Gaussian operator5 Λ(𝑥) = (2𝜋𝜎}3/2 𝑒

−

̂ −𝑥)2
(𝑄
2𝜎2

, whose width 𝜎 = 10−7 m is a new constant of

nature (𝑄̂ is the position operator). When the wave function is 𝜓, the rate of collapses
with center x is given by :
𝑟(𝑥|𝜓) = ⟨𝜓|Λ(𝑥)𝜓⟩,

(3)

The rate of collapse depends on N, the number of particles, which thus can be taken as a
measure of how big the object under consideration is. Because of that, macroscopic
objects, like cats, very quickly collapse either into the state that describe a dead cat or
into the one describing the cat who’s still alive.

3.3. Many-Worlds Theory
The third standard solution of the Schrödinger cat problem is the so-called Everett
interpretation, also known as many-worlds theory [Everett 1957], [Wallace 2002]. This
theory does not modify the law of evolution for the wave function, and does not add
anything to it. Rather, it is usually characterized as accepting that physical objects
possess contradictory properties. The basic idea is that superposition states do not really
letter is used to denote a random variable, while the values taken by it are denoted by small
letters.
4 I am using the world ‘particle’ in a loose way to preserve the usual language, given that,
strictly speaking, there are no particles in this theory.
5 I am currently ignoring particle labelling, to simplify the notation. A correct equation can be
found, e.g., in [AGTZ 2008].
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describe a single object, like a cat, having contradictory properties, like being dead and
not dead at the same time. In contrast, they describe states of the world in which there is
more than one thing. That is, there are two cats, one dead and one alive, and they are in
different ‘worlds,’ different regions of space-time. We do not see both cats because the
universe is bigger than we think; we live in one world, say the one with a living cat, and
the others are such that they do not interact with us, and this is why we could not detect
them.

4. The Wave Function and Configuration Space
Let us now take a step back. The usual story is that the problem of quantum mechanics
is the presence of macroscopic superpositions, and the different solutions either try to
get rid of them (Bohm, GRW) or they embrace them (many-worlds). According to the
proponents of the PO approach, instead, the problem of quantum mechanics is not that
there are macroscopic superpositions. Rather, the problem is the assumption that the wave
function represents physical object. All the theories we have just seen, as stated, take the
wave function as the object that represent matter. The PO approach instead proposes
that this is a mistake: one always should deny (a), even in a stronger way than Bohmian
mechanics does. That is, one always should add something to the description provided
by the wave function [AGTZ 2008]. Or better: one should always drop the wave
function, and have something in space-time to represent matter. If not, we run into
undesired and unnecessary difficulties.
The wave function is not the right kind of mathematical object that is suitable to
naturally describe material objects living in three-dimensional space evolving in time.
In fact, the wave function 𝜓 = 𝜓(𝑟1 , … , 𝑟𝑁 ) is a mathematical object that lives in a very
abstract space: the space of all 𝑟1 , … , 𝑟𝑁 . In classical mechanics, where these variables
represent the positions of N particles, this space has been called configuration space, for
obvious reasons. In a theory with just the wave function, though, strictly speaking there
are no particles, but the space kept its name nonetheless. The dimension of such space is
M=3N. If the wave function is taken to represent physical objects, then physical space,
the space in which physical objects live, would be configuration space. If so, one would
have to explain why we think we live in a three-dimensional world, while we do not.
That is, one would have to come up with a story to derive ℝ3 from configuration space.
One has to add to the specification of the theory some rule in order to do so, and this is
what has been done in [Albert 1996]. Whether the proposed maps are successful is up
for debate [Monton 2002, 2006]. In addition, it seems that this position provides a
picture of the world that is too revisionary to be easily accepted [Allori 2013a,b]. Since
all there is in this theory is the wave function, the statement “there is a table here”
cannot mean literally that there is a table here, since there exists no table, as indeed
there exists no three-dimensional object at all. Objects do not exist independently to one
9

another, they are all ‘mashed into’ the description provided by the wave function. And
the information regarding each one of them has to be extracted from it with the use of
something more than the wave function alone. At best, what one might mean is that the
wave function is concentrated in a certain location, the one at which the table is. This
implies that tables, chairs, humans and all three-dimensional objects do not exist at all
in the way we usually think about them. In this framework, the nice explanatory
schema that was developed in classical theories to derive the macroscopic properties in
terms of the microscopic constituents has to be dropped, and an entirely new
reductionist account has to be developed from scratch. Thus, it seems that this can
hardly be regarded as a solution for the problem of making sense of quantum
mechanics, especially in presence of much more sensible alternatives (as we will see in
the following). Since one does not gain any new understanding in entertaining the idea
that we live in configuration space and that we are made of wave functions, but rather
we only inherit new problems to solve, then there seem to be no reason why we should
take this position6.
Accordingly, the proponents of the PO approach reject that the wave function can
represent matter: for the reasons we just saw, the PO has to be in three-dimensional
space, or four-dimensional space-time. Consequently, theories that solve the problem of
the Schrödinger cat will be satisfactory not because they deny one of the three
assumptions we discussed, but rather because each of them postulates the existence of
something different from the wave function to describe physical objects. According to
the PO approach, quantum theories, like any other fundamental physical theory,
possess a definite architecture in which the various variables play different roles: the
primitive variables describe matter, the nomological variables, namely the wave
function, spell out the law of motion for the PO. The GRW theory, thus, is never ‘bare,’
it is never a theory about the wave function. Rather, different ‘GRW theories’ have been
6

One might think that, given the above conclusion, we should also reject string theory. In fact in
string theory physical space is supposed to have 10 (or 11) dimensions; if the complaint against
the wave function ontology is that the dimensionality of configuration space is M, where M is
not 3, then M=10 (or 11) seems just an instance of the type of theories we should reject.
However, there is an important disanalogy: in string theory, the starting point is that the
number of dimensions of physical space is greater than three; however, it is assumed that all
dimensions except three are ‘compactified,’ curled up on themselves, and thus inaccessible to
physical objects. Scientists are still looking for mechanisms that would explain why it is the
case. Indeed, string theorists hope to find a unique way of compactifying the redundant
dimensions, that is, a unique string theory. Thus, in string theory the extra dimensions are
added but they are promptly compactified, in order to keep the world objectively always like ℝ3,
so that there is no actual explanatory gap between physical and apparent dimensions. In the
case of configuration space, instead, the extra dimensions are equally accessible to matter, and
one needs a new mechanism to ‘get back’ to the usual three.
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proposed: GRWm, a theory with a three-dimensional field PO, to be identified with the
matter density of stuff [BGG 1995], and GRWf, a theory with a PO of space-time events
[Bell 1987]. Accordingly, the many-worlds theory is not a theory about the wave
function also. We will see these theories in a little more detail in Section 6.

5. Quantum Theory Construction Kit
According to the PO approach, then, all the theories above should be reconsidered: they
all have a spatiotemporal PO, and the wave function, just like the electromagnetic fields
in classical electrodynamics, has the role of generating the space-time ‘trajectories’ of
the PO. Bohmian mechanics can be naturally understood as a particle PO, while the
situation is trickier in GRW theory and many-worlds: there can be different, more or
less natural, PO for these theories, as we will see in Section 6.
Indeed, there can be many more theories than those we saw in the previous section. In
fact, the PO approach provides us with a set of rules for generating quantum theories:
 Make a metaphysical assumption: select a spatiotemporal PO;
 Select a law of evolution for the PO in terms of some appropriate mathematical
object (usually the wave function);
 Select a law of evolution for this object.
This game has been played in [AGTZ 2008, 2011, 2014], in which a variety of theories
have been proposed and then analyzed.

5.1. Empirical Adequacy and Effective Empirical Equivalence
A first constraint on a theory is empirical adequacy. In other words, we are free to
choose the metaphysical hypothesis (i.e. the PO), and then we are free to play with its
evolution and the other objects in it (including the wave function), but we have to make
it the case that the theory does not get the empirical predictions wrong.
More to the point, a theory is empirically adequate if it is able to account for the
macroscopic appearances. Since orthodox quantum mechanics is empirically adequate
in this sense, all it takes is that the theory under consideration is empirically equivalent
(or effectively so) to orthodox quantum mechanics: two worlds, governed by the two
theories, share the same macroscopic appearance. That is, a theory may be (exactly)
empirically equivalent to orthodox quantum mechanics, in the sense that there is no
possible experiment that can in principle distinguish between the two. Other theories
instead may be effectively empirically equivalent: their predictions are close enough to
the ones of orthodox quantum theory so that no discrepancy has been detected so far,
even if it is in principle possible to do so. These theories would still recover the
macroscopic appearances well enough to be empirically adequate, and in this case, one
may speak of ‘effective empirical equivalence’ with orthodox quantum theory.
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Thus, for effective empirical equivalence with orthodox quantum mechanics all we
need to ask is that the probability of getting, say, z as an experiment result, agrees with
the distribution predicted by orthodox quantum mechanics. To get z as an experiment
result is to observe a pointer to point to z, and the orthodox quantum distributions for z
can be obtained from the Schrödinger wave function 𝜓𝑡 for a sufficiently big system
containing the pointer by integrating |𝜓𝑡 |2 over all configurations in which the pointer
points to z. When this is so, we may speak of an ‘effective |𝜓𝑡 |2–distribution,’ or of
macroscopic |𝜓𝑡 |2 Schrödinger equivariance [AGTZ 2008]. If a theory is proven to have
such property, then it is empirically adequate.
Thus we will discard the theories that are not empirically adequate, and then we will
use some superempirical virtues to select the most sensible theory(ies) (see section 7).

6. Possible Quantum Metaphysics
In this section, we will see some examples of how different POs can be combined with
different evolutions, and different nomological variables. We will consider three types7
of PO: particles, matter density field, flashes.
6.1. Particles
Let us start simple: let us imagine matter is made of (dimensionless) particles. Thus,
they are naturally represented as points in three-dimensional space. This is our starting
metaphysical assumption. Then we can construct several empirically adequate theories:
A. Bohmian Mechanics: Actually, we do not even have to build a particle quantum
theory for scratch because we already have one that would naturally fit the bill:
Bohmian mechanics. In fact, this theory can be read naturally as a theory of particles
that move in three dimensions according to (2). That equation involves the wave
function, which in turns evolves according to the Schrodinger equation (1). The role
of the wave function in the theory is not to represent matter, but rather to tell matter
how to move: it is the nomological variable. Bohmian mechanics is (exactly)
empirically equivalent to orthodox quantum mechanics, and thus it is an empirically
adequate theory.
B. Sip: Another possibility of a quantum theory with a particle PO that has been
considered in the literature [Bell 1987] is what has been later dubbed “Sip” in [AGTZ
2008]8. In this theory, the wave function evolves according to Schrödinger’s
equation, and the PO is given by instantaneous randomly distributed configurations
without any temporal correlation among them.

7
8

Clearly, other choices, such as strings, are possible, but they have not been considered here.
‘S’ from Schrödinger evolution, ‘i’ for independent, ‘p’ for particles.
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C. GRWp3: One can build other theories of particles, playing with their evolution and
the one of the wave function. For instance, a theory that combines a particle PO and
a GRW-like evolving wave function in an empirically adequate way has been
dubbed “GRWp3” in [AGTZ 2014] and was first proposed in [Bedingham 2011]. In
this theory, the wave function, as usual in this approach, has the role of
implementing the law of evolution for the PO, and in this theory, it is fairly
complicated. In fact, the particles evolve according to Bohm’s equation (2) with a
given wave function until a random time T; from that time onward, they will still
evolve according to Bohm’s law but with another wave function, namely one that
has undergone a collapse. In fact, at random times T the wave function collapses
into the actual position of the particle at T, but ‘displaced’ at random [Tumulka
2011]9.
D. GRWp6: Another empirically adequate theory, dubbed “GRWp6” in [AGTZ 2014], is
such that the particles are the PO and the wave function evolves according to the
GRW evolution. The particles evolve according to Bohm’s law (2) between the
collapses, like in GRWp3. However, at the collapse center, then, all the particles
jump at random.
E. MBM: In the PO approach, the wave function, since it does not represent matter, can
in principle be dispensed with, or replaced by another mathematical object. Thus,
[AGTZ 2014] propose, as a toy theory to illustrate how one can play this game, what
they called “MBM,” master equation Bohmian mechanics, in which the wave
function is completely absent. In this theory, the PO is of particles, which evolve to
something similar to Bohm’s equation (2): instead of the wave function, though, we
have what in quantum mechanics everybody calls a density matrix ρ. However, here
the density matrix, which evolves according to the Limblad equation, is taken to be
an object not parasitic of the wave function. It turns out that this theory is not strictly
speaking empirically equivalent to Bohmian mechanics, but its predictions slightly
differ in a way that is currently undetectable and thus it is empirically adequate10.

6.2. Matter Field
Alternatively, we could think of matter being continuous instead of discrete. Thus, our
metaphysical hypothesis is that matter is represented by a field in three-dimensional
space:
9

Simpler theories like GRWp2, a theory in which the particles would evolve according to
Bohm’s law and the wave function would simply collapse randomly like in the original GRW
law; and GRWp4, a theory in which the particles would evolve according to Bohm’s law and
the wave function would simply collapse into the particle’s position without any displacement,
would not be empirically adequate. See [AGTZ 2014] for more details.
10 This theory is empirically equivalent to GRWm and GRWf, that we will describe later .
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𝑁

𝑚(𝑥, 𝑡) = ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∫ 𝑑𝑞1 … 𝑑𝑞𝑁 𝛿 3 (𝑞𝑖 − 𝑥)||𝜓𝑡 (𝑞1 … 𝑞𝑁 , 𝑡)|2 ,

(4)

𝑖=1

where N is the number of ‘particles,’ and 𝑚𝑖 their masses. Given this PO, one can have
several empirically adequate theories.
A. Sm: Schrödinger naturally tried to see whether an ontology based on the wave
function was possible: he had his famous equation at the very core of quantum
theory, and the wave function was the object this equation was for. He did not
propose the wave function to represent matter, but rather that something like (4)
should be taken as representing matter, where the wave function was evolving
according to the Schrödinger equation. However, this field would inherit the same
superpositions of the wave function, and thus he dismissed this possibility. As we
saw, superpositions are not the problem, so his rejection was quite too hasty: this
theory has a viable PO (see Section 7.1 for what may be regarded as a drawback of
this theory). This theory has thus been dubbed “Sm” in [AGTZ 2008].
B. GRWm: A theory with a matter density PO defined by (4) and a GRW-evolving
wave function has been proposed in [BBG 1995] and called “GRWm” in [AGTZ
2008]. This theory’s predictions differ from the ones of orthodox quantum theory,
but they are currently undetectable. Thus, the theory is empirically adequate, and
can be proven to be empirically equivalent to MBM [AGTZ 2014].
C. Mm: In analogy with MBM, [AGTZ 2014] propose a matter density theory whose
evolution is implemented by a Limblad-evolving density matrix rather than a wave
function. It can be proven that this theory is empirically equivalent to GRWm (and
thus to MBM).

6.3. Flashes
Last but not least, one could imagine the PO not to be in space, evolving in time, but to
be directly located in space-time. In a theory with a particles PO, one looks at the
particles’ trajectories in space-time. Configurations of the same particle at different
times are continuously connected by the trajectory, but this is not necessary. For
instance, in Sip one would have configurations jumping from one moment to the next
without any connection. Alternatively, one could forget about particles, and simply say
that there are certain points in space-time, that one can call ‘flashes,’ that are nonempty, so to speak, and they represent what matter is made of. Thus, the flashes will be
the set 𝐹 = {(𝑋1 , 𝑇1 ), … , (𝑋𝑘 , 𝑇𝑘 ), … }, k being a progressive natural number that indicate
the time progression of the flashes. It is an unusual but possible picture: in this theory,
matter is neither made of particles with world-lines, such as in classical or Bohmian
mechanics, nor of a continuous distribution of matter such as in GRWm, but rather of
discrete events in space-time, in fact finitely many events in every finite-size space-time.
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Given this PO, one can again play with the different possible combinations to obtain
various empirically adequate alternatives.
A. Sf: [AGTZ 2008] propose that a flash PO could be combined with a Schrödingerevolving wave function, and they called this theory “Sf.” The space-time locations of
the flashes are generated by (3) as in the GRW mechanism, but the wave function
never collapses.
B. GRWf: Another theory of flashes was proposed in [Bell 1987] and then adopted in
[Tumulka 2006]. This theory was called “GRWf in [AGTZ 2008] because the wave
function collapses according to the GRW evolution, every flash corresponds to one
of the spontaneous collapses of the wave function, and its space-time location is just
the space-time location of that collapse given by (3). The predictions of this theory
are in accordance with the one of GRWm (and thus with MBM and Mm). Therefore,
the theory is effectively empirically adequate.
C. Mf: Also in analogy with MBM and Mm, we have Mf, a theory of flashes in which
the rate of the flashes is not generated by the wave function but by a Limblad
density matrix [AGTZ 2014]. This theory turns out to be empirically equivalent to
MBM, Mm, and, more importantly, to GRWm, making the theory effectively
empirically adequate.
A note about all these theories: if the number N of ‘particles’ is large, as in the case of a
macroscopic object, the number of flashes is large, too (if λ=10-15 s-1 and N=1023, we
obtain R=108 flashes/second). Therefore, for a reasonable choice of the parameters of the
theory, a cubic centimeter of solid matter contains more than 108 flashes per second.
That is to say, large numbers of flashes can form macroscopic shapes, such as tables and
chairs. At almost every time, however, space is in fact empty, containing no flashes and
thus no matter.

7. The Meaning of the Wave Function
Before evaluating these theories, let us focus on the wave function. If the PO of the
theory are the building blocks of physical world, they are the stuff in three-dimensional
space physical objects are made of, while the wave function is not, what exactly is the
wave function? If there is a category one can safely put the wave function in, then
arguably it is more like a law of nature than like anything else11. In other words, the
wave function is more suitable to represent a law of nature than a physical object [DGZ

Alternatively, some have argued that the wave function should be understood as a
dispositional property. See [ELHD 2014] and [Monton 2006] for details.
11

15

1997], [GT 2000], [GZ 2013]12. The idea is that the wave function is similar to the
Hamiltonian in classical mechanics: it is the generator of motion.
Several objections have been raised against this view (see [BW 2005], [Belot 2012]). First,
since the PO represents what physical objects are made of, while the wave function
does not, either one denies the existence of the wave function or has to admit that
something is more real than something else is. However, saying that the wave function
is real but not physical does not imply there are different degrees of reality: in fact, they
might be two kinds of substances, or entities. After all, the very same objections could
be raised (but they are not) to a Platonist in the philosophy of mathematics, a dualist in
the philosophy of mind, and a realist with respect to laws in ethics or in philosophy of
science. Other objections focus on the disanalogies between the wave function and the
general conception of laws. For instance, it is argued that the wave function cannot be
regarded as a law because it interacts with the particles and thus seems to be more alike
matter than laws. One could respond saying that the wave function is similar to the
potential in classical mechanics in this respect: the potential interacts with the particles
but no one considers it real. Also, it has been argued that the wave function evolves in
time, while laws are static. In this case, one could just not be bothered by it [Smolin
2013]. In any case, since the idea that laws of nature are static is a classical intuition, one
could maintain that instead of trying to force our classical intuitions onto quantum
mechanics, we should realize that quantum mechanics is telling us something new
about laws of nature [Callender forthcoming]. Be that as it may, one could notice that
there is evidence suggesting that in a future quantum cosmology the wave function
would be static [GT 2000], eliminating the problem. Another objection is that the wave
function is contingent, in the sense that varies with the subsystem, and in contrast, laws
are universal. A last, similar, complaint could be that the wave function is controllable:
we can prepare physical systems in the state that we want. If so, it is difficult to regard
the wave function as a law, since we do not seem to have control over them. These last
two objections can be taken care of remembering that the wave function we can have
control of, and that changes from system to system, is the wave function of the system
(the conditional or effective wave function [GZ 2013]), while the one that should be
intended as nomological is the wave function of the universe (which is universal and
we cannot control).
8. Primitive Ontology and Theory Evaluation
All the quantum theories presented in Section 6 have different POs, therefore they
cannot be all true. Because they are either exactly or effectively empirically equivalent
[Callender forthcoming] has recently motivated the view in the Humean framework of laws
of nature.
12
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to orthodox quantum mechanics, one cannot use experiments to settle the dispute over
which theory is most likely to be true. The issue will have to be settled based on
something else. Let us explore some feature of some of these theories here, before
arriving to an evaluation.

8.1. Primitive Ontology and Many-Worlds
Because of linearity, in any theory in which we have a wave function evolving
according to Schrödinger’s equation there are superpositions. Thus, the wave function
of the universe must presumably be thought of as consisting of several packets that are
very far apart in configuration space that correspond to unrealized states of affairs: in
the Schrödinger cat example, if when we open the box the cat is alive, the state of affairs
corresponding to the dead cat are not realized. Some of the packets will have support
in events that did not take place in our time, such as for example the dinosaurs have
never become extinct.
In Bohmian mechanics, this is not a problem: since configurations are continuously
connected in time, it is not possible for the configuration to jump, in an instant, from the
support of one wave packet to a macroscopically distinct one. However, in the other “S”
theories the situation is trickier. In Sip there is no connection whatsoever between what
there is at a given instant of time and what there is at the previous or following instant.
In this case, thus, the configuration will very probably visit in every second those
distant regions supporting the other packets: therefore, at time t there can be dinosaurs
and at time t+dt they have disappeared. Therefore, many worlds exist, not at the same
time, but one after another. Because of this, if this theory is correct, the fact that right
now there are memories and records of the past does not guarantee that they are
actually reliable. Rather, the records are most likely to be false: at one instant, there is a
set of what we would call ‘records’ that actually do not reflect in any way truthfully
what has happened. That means, plainly, that they are not records at all. Still, there is no
way to experimentally distinguish that theory from, say, Bohmian mechanics.
Similarly, in Sf and Sm (just like in Mf and Mm), the superpositions of the wave
function are inherited by the flashes and the matter density field. By the linearity of the
Schrödinger evolution, the flashes and the mass density form independent families of
correlated flashes or mass density associated with the terms of the superposition, with
no interaction between the families: the live cat and the dead cat do not interact with
each other, as they correspond to alternative states of the cat. Thus, they can indeed be
regarded as comprising many worlds, superimposed on a single space-time. Since the
different worlds do not interact among themselves, they are, so to speak, reciprocally
transparent.
Note that the concept of a ‘world’ is just a practical matter, relevant to comparing the
matter density function provided by the theory to our observations. However, this is
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not a problem: there is no need for a precise definition of ‘world,’ just as we can get
along without a precise definition of ‘table.’

8.2. Independent and Dependent Primitive Ontologies
Notice that the matter field 𝑚 and the flashes 𝐹 are functionals of the wave function,
and they are not, strictly speaking, additional variables, as the positions of particles in
Bohmian mechanics. Nonetheless, they are additional assumptions of the theory that
needs to be specified in order to have a complete description of the world. There could
be many functions, not just the ones specified by equations (3) or (4), that define the
matter density or the distribution of the flashes, and one should specify which ones are
to be taken as the definitions of 𝑚 and 𝐹.
In philosophical jargon, when there is dependence between two variables, it is said that
the dependent variable supervenes on the other. The template for the definition of
supervenience is the following: Y supervenes on X if no two possible situations are
indiscernible with respect to X while differing in Y. For instance, chemical properties
supervene on physical properties insofar as any two possible situations that are
physically indistinguishable are chemically indistinguishable. One could notice that the
mass density and the distribution of the flashes supervene on the wave function: there
cannot be a difference in the mass density or in the distribution of the flashes without a
difference in the wave function. As we saw, this is very different to what happens in.
e.g. Bohmian mechanics, in which positions are specified independently from the wave
function. The mass density and the distribution of the flashes are not specified in
addition to the wave function, but rather are determined by it. [Lewis 2006] has argued
that there is no need of adding the mass density or the flashes to the wave function in
GRW, since they are already present in the wave function. Nevertheless, this
unspecified supervenience is not enough to arrive to Lewis’ conclusion. An important
distinction to see why this is the case is between logical (or conceptual) and natural (or
nomic) supervenience. In general, when we have logical supervenience between X and
Y, we say that X entails or implicates Y, i.e. Y = f(X). For instance, the description “table”
supervenes logically on the configuration of the particles composing the table: the table
is just a bunch of particles. A different dependence is given by natural supervenience:
“the pressure exerted by one mole of a gas systematically depends on its temperature
and volume according to the law 𝑝𝑉 = 𝐾𝑇, where 𝐾 is a constant. [...] it is empirically
impossible that two distinct moles of gas could have the same temperature and volume,
but different pressure [...] But this supervenience is weaker than logical supervenience.
It is logically possible that a mole of gas with a given temperature and volume might
have a different pressure; imagine a world in which the gas constant K is larger or
smaller, for example. Rather, it is just a fact about nature that there is this correlation”
[Chalmers 1996]. Another example of natural supervenience is the one between the
charge density and the electromagnetic fields [Maudlin 2007]. The relation between the
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two is 𝜚 =

1
𝜀0

∇ ∙ 𝐸, and it is a law of nature. The distinction between logical and natural

supervenience can be summarized as follows: if Y supervenes logically on X, then once
God has created a world with certain X, the Y comes along for free; if Y supervenes
naturally on X, then after making the X, God had to do more work in order to make the
Y: he had to make a law relating the X and the Y. Once the law is defined, X will
automatically bring along the Y. Nevertheless, one could, in principle, have had a
situation where they did not. As we have seen above, for example in Bohmian
mechanics the PO does not supervene on the wave function: we need to specify the PO
in addition to the wave function. In the case of theories of flashes and mass density (and
also in some theories with particles PO, like GRWp6) instead the PO is determined by,
supervenes on, the wave function naturally, and not logically. That is, it is an additional
law of nature.
We have previously seen that the measurement problem is the problem of the
inadequacy of the wave function as the PO of quantum mechanics. Therefore, possible
solutions of the measurement differ not in the fact that either we add something or we
let the wave function evolve to an equation that is different form Schrödinger’s
evolution. Rather, different solutions are characterized by whether the PO is
independent of the wave function or it is defined in terms of it. Therefore, we have:
1) PO independent of 𝜓: the PO is genuinely an additional variable, chosen
independently of the nomological variable (usually the wave function). This is
the case of Bohmian mechanics, GRWp3, MBM, Sip.
2) PO functional of 𝜓: the PO is defined in terms of the nomological variable
(usually the wave function) in a particular way. This is the case of theories with
flashes and mass density, and of GRWp6.

8.3. Primitive Ontology and Symmetries
As we saw already, because of the view that the various solutions to the Schrödinger cat
are ultimately not about wave functions but about histories of a PO in space-time, the
law of evolution of the wave function should no longer be regarded as playing the
central role in the theory. The wave function is a nomological variable: it helps
implementing the law of motion for the PO.
Because of this, the symmetries of a theory are determined by the PO, not by the wave
function. Roughly put, to say that a theory has a given symmetry is to say that the
possible histories of the PO (those that are allowed by the theory), when transformed
according to the symmetry, will again be possible histories for the theory; and the
possible probability distributions on the histories, those that are allowed by the theory,
when transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible probability
distributions for the theory [AGTZ 2008].
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Therefore, the invariance of a quantum theory directly concerns the law for the PO; it
concerns the invariance of the law for the wave function only indirectly, contrary to
what is often, erroneously, believed. Changing PO could (probably will) change the
symmetry properties of the theory. In the literature, there are some examples of this, for
instance, GRWf has been modified to make it relativistic invariant [Tumulka 2006], a
relativistic extension of Sm has been proposed in [AGTZ 2101], while GRWm still
awaits a relativistic generalization.

9. Final Remarks
The different features of the quantum theories analyzed in this paper are summarized
in table 1. Let us conclude with few considerations about theory selection.
If you like particles, just go Bohmian. What is the point of complicating the theory with
a non-linear evolving wave function, as in GRWp3? Why make the trajectories
discontinuous, like in GRWp6? More difficult to justify is why not use the density
matrices. Presumably, one would reject it on the basis that it is unnecessarily
complicated. Sip, as we saw, has a many-worlds character but also implies that our
memories are entirely unreliable, so does not seem to be a reasonable choice. Thus, if
you like many-worlds, a PO of particles should not be your choice.
Primitive Ontology
Theory
Particles
Bohmian
Mechanics
Sip
GRWp3
GRWp6
MBM
Sm
GRWm
Mm
Sf
GRWf
Mf

Matter
field

Flashes

PO
independent
of wave
function

√

√

√
√
√
√

√
√

ManyWorlds
Charact
er

Empirical
Equivalence
with orthodox
quantum theory

Relativistic
Version

√

√
(foliation)

√

√
√
√

√

√

√
√

√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√

√
√

Figure 1

If you like continuous matter, GRWm seems to be the best choice, unless you like manyworlds, in which case you would pick Sm. Mm instead seems unnecessary complicated.
Arguably, though, the choice of an extravagant metaphysics such as many-worlds,
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which is neither natural nor mandatory, is difficult to support in absence of an
independent justification.
If you like flashes, GRWf seems to give the best balance of mathematical simplicity and
metaphysical sensibleness, since it does not possess a many-world character as Sf, and it
is not mathematically complicated as Mf.
However, which PO is actually better? Particles are more familiar, in the sense that
previous, well-developed, and well-known theories like classical mechanics had a PO of
particles. Arguably, the PO of continuous fields is less developed and thus requires
more work. Flashes are surely a more exotic choice of PO, but they seem to be
connected to relativistic invariance [Tumulka 2006], so presumably are worth taken
seriously because of that, since other theories, like Bohmian mechanics, can be made
relativistic invariant only adding a foliation in space-time [DMGZ 1998].
As a side note, one may wonder why we did not have so many theories in the prequantum era. The answer is that, in contrast with what happened in quantum
mechanics, in classical mechanics it was clear from the very beginning what the
metaphysical hypothesis was. Accordingly, its law of evolution was selected as the
simplest among the (infinite) alternatives. Newton started from the hypothesis that the
world is made of particles and then continued accordingly.
In any case, if we follow the PO approach and we get the wave function out of the
picture as a possible entity to represent matter, quantum mechanics just becomes a
‘regular’ theory (with the qualifications that we have discussed): none of the theories
considered so far is contradictory, or riddled with paradoxes. If something is puzzling
in quantum mechanics then, it is nonlocality, but to properly discussing it, we would
have to write another paper.
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